Saturday, 9 February 2013
Wednesday, 6 February 2013
Return of A King: An Analysis of Western Regime Change in Afghanistan
Consider this scenario:
A Western army, controlled by a
megacorporation belonging to the world’s most powerful imperialistic nation, invades
a poor, mountainous, isolated Central Asian Muslim state on false pretences,
citing a nonexistent, entirely manufactured “threat” from foreign agents in the
country. Nobody is quite sure what to do
with the country after the invasion, though – and nobody thinks it really
matters. The invasion is the thing.
In the build-up to the invasion, common
sense is ignored. History is deliberately twisted to claim the opposite of the
facts. Politicians from the imperialist Western country call themselves a force
for civilisation and state that “those who are not for us are against us.” Reports
from the people on the ground in that nation are ignored, while optimistic
assessments from chair-bound “intelligence analysts” who are far away from the
scene and have never even visited the country are taken as a basis for policy.
The targeted country’s government attempts
to negotiate and calls for talks. The Western army, on the other hand,
completely rejects negotiations and instead is bent on conquest. It decides to
invade from the south with a substantial ground force comprising soldiers
brought from far away, and for its allies it has some northern tribes of the
targeted nation who are restive under the rule of the government – which mostly
consists of people from one particular ethnic group.
Does this sound vaguely familiar?
With its superior military technology, this
Western army quickly routs the country’s armed forces – which essentially
comprise the private levies of a disparate set of tribal warlords – ejects its
ruler, and brings in a puppet to replace him. This puppet is a man who has not
even visited the country in decades, who is completely out of touch with the
ground realities and has no power base at all. He has also been in the pay of
the Western army’s parent nation for many years, and is therefore completely
beholden to the foreigners.
Having installed him in the seat of
government, the Western army does not leave, but instead builds a large base on
the outskirts of the capital, and talks of establishing a permanent presence –
even de facto annexation of the
nation. The puppet leader is soon proved to possess no power at all, with the
Western army’s authorities deciding who his advisors and ministers will be, and
with his writ barely extending beyond the walls of his official residence.
The “foreign threat” – which never existed
in the first place – has been defeated. The puppet ruler has been placed in the
capital. The occupation army could now legitimately withdraw, because the
alleged aims of the war have been fulfilled. Instead, it decides to stay in
place and occupy the country indefinitely.
Now, while part of the original government
(which had desperately tried to avert the war via negotiations) has been bought
over, captured or otherwise neutralised, the former ruler and a close clique
have dispersed into the countryside, there to lead a small but growing resistance
movement. The Western occupation forces are aware of this resistance movement,
which gets at least some, though fairly fickle, support from a neighbouring
country. However, they disregard its importance, and withdraw a proportion of
their forces to fight another – and
completely illegal – war of choice against a third country.
Getting more familiar, is it?
Meanwhile, the Western army’s troops freely
disregard the local culture, rape some girls, seduce others, insult and assault
civilians, and, as it were, go out of their way to offend the natives’
sensibilities – all in the knowledge of their own impunity, because the alleged
government of the nation is powerless and entirely dependent on the army itself
for support. The occupying army also buys the loyalty of the warlords, without
whom it’s impossible to govern a country that has never accepted central
authority without rebellion. Almost all supplies, too, have to be brought in
from the south, through hostile foreign territory and then over mountain passes
whose inhabitant tribes have to be paid protection money not to attack the
convoys. The occupation is an expensive business.
This purchase of support soon gets even more expensive, because the people of
the country are so poor that they can’t be successfully taxed to finance their
own occupation. So, money has to be poured in from outside, in large amounts, and
the Western government’s coffers begin to run out. They order economy measures.
The primary economy measure, with no other
option in sight, is to stop payments to the warlords. Their support will no
longer be purchased. Instead, a new professional National Army will be
recruited, armed and trained, whose loyalty will be not to the local warlord
but to the national government – which, of course, as everyone is very well
aware, is a powerless Western rubber stamp. Both these measures, of course,
infuriate and alienate the warlords, who begin to foment their own insurgency,
independent of the one run by the former government.
Sounds even more familiar?
As time goes on, the various insurgent
groups (many of whom are led by people armed and paid by the occupation in the
first place) get increasingly powerful, with the occupation forces finding it
more and more difficult to leave their camps. The puppet ruler, in order to
safeguard his own position, begins criticising his Western overlords, but is
careful not to actually take any steps to order them to leave. Major religious
figures issue calls to jihad against the infidel invaders. Alarming reports
begin filtering back to the homeland of increasing hatred and imminent explosion
into open revolt. However, the Western commanders deny it all, and send
ludicrously optimistic reports saying things are under control, and everything
is fine. And they continue the blunders which foment even more hatred among the
occupied population.
Slowly but steadily, the various rebellions
grow stronger and more overt. Step by step, the occupation is forced out of
small bases in the countryside, compelled to fall back on fortified positions
in the major cities. Even these are soon under attack, with guerrillas in the
hills sniping at exposed troops and attacking small parties of soldiers. Within
a remarkably short time, the victorious Western army, despite its still overwhelming
technological superiority, is cowering in its bases, besieged and looking at
the inevitability of defeat. Desperate attempts at “negotiating” (the very
tactics the occupation had rejected earlier) are made in an effort to save face
and “withdraw with honour”. They – quite predictably – fail.
The occupation is beaten. It is only a
matter of time, all claims to the contrary, before it withdraws in ruin,
leaving its puppet ruler to his fate. And then, the former ruler will obviously
supplant the puppet usurper and reclaim power, which means the entire invasion
will have achieved exactly nothing at all,
except the devastation of the nation.
And, after the defeat, the occupation army blames
a third country for supporting and promoting the rebellion, an accusation
without basis in fact.
Well? I’m talking about Afghanistan from 2001
till today, right?
Half right. I’m talking about Afghanistan, from 1839 to 1842.
I’ve just finished reading a remarkable
(and very large and well-annotated) book, William Dalrymple’s Return Of A King: The Battle For Afghanistan
1839-42. In the course of this article, I will review the book and give my
own independent opinion on the parallels between 1839 and 2013 – because those
parallels are incredibly close, even more so than the author himself concludes.
Let’s first go over the events, as
recounted in Dalrymple’s (eminently readable) book:
In the early 1800s, Britain was the pre-eminent
imperial power on the surface of the planet. It (in the shape of a private
megacorporation with its own administrators and military forces, the East India
Company) was expanding rapidly throughout the Indian subcontinent. The Mughal
Emperor Akbar II in Delhi was, though nominally its suzerain, in reality its
prisoner. The only relatively strong Indian kingdom remaining was the Sikh
empire, which owed its continued existence to its wily king, Ranjeet Singh, and
his French-trained and –officered army. But once he was gone, its days would
clearly be numbered.
To the west of Ranjeet Singh’s dominions
was the Persian Empire, much weaker than it had been before. To the north,
stretching from Peshawar to what is now Tajikistan, and from Herat to Kashmir,
was an entity called by various names, including the Afghan Empire and Khurasan,
whose twin capitals were Kabul and Peshawar. And beyond that, also expanding
rapidly like the British, was the Russian Empire.
There’s a lot of internet talk these days
about Afghanistan having always been a “hell-hole”. It is, of course,
completely false. Afghanistan was no mountainous backwater. It had been, for
thousands of years, a major trade crossroads between the flourishing markets of
Samarkand, Hindustan (modern India and Pakistan), Persia, China, and Europe to
the west. Like all such trading markets, it had absorbed the cultures of those
places and cities like Kabul and Herat had become centres of learning and art.
But by the late eighteenth century things were in decline.
By the early 1800s, the glory days of the old
Afghan Empire were long past. After the death of the last major Persian
emperor, Nadir Shah, who had captured and plundered Delhi, one of his generals,
a Pashtun by the name of Ahmed Shah Abdali, had taken over his war chest and
carved out a kingdom of his own, the Afghan Durrani Empire. Abdali was of the
Sadozai clan, and had made an agreement with his rivals of the Barakzai clan;
the Sadozais would be kings, while the Barakzais would be their wazirs and
ministers.
After Abdali’s death, the Empire rapidly
fell apart, with Sadozai princes fighting among themselves for power. The traditional Afghan way of buying loyalty,
money payments to tribal leaders, was no longer an option. The one sure Afghan
route to riches, raiding North India for loot, was blocked by the powerful Sikh
army, trained and armed by the French to European standards; and by the
expanding power of the British, which had reached the Punjab. The Imperial
crown was an impossible burden for anyone not of exceptional ability – and
there was nobody among the Sadozais capable of anything approaching statecraft.
By 1809, the peripheral parts of the
kingdom were gone, the treasury was empty, and the land broken by civil war.
On the throne in the Afghan winter capital
of Peshawar sat a Sadozai king, the young Shah Shuja al-Mulk. He was desperate
for an alliance with the expanding British Empire to the south-east, and was
the first Afghan monarch to accept a British embassy. But in 1809 he was defeated
in battle by his half-brother (whom he had himself defeated to gain the throne)
and forced to flee for his life along with his harīm and
camp-followers. After several adventures, he ended up in the Sikh capital of
Lahore, a prisoner of Ranjeet Singh, who extorted his wealth from him,
including the Koh-i-Noor Diamond. Finally managing to escape from Lahore, he
crossed the frontier into British territory at Ludhiana, where the East India
Company begrudgingly gave him a house and a pension.
But Shuja was not content with living the
life of a refugee. He maintained a court in exile, and over the next few years
he made several attempts to regain his throne. Every single one of these
attempts – while tactically sound – ended in disaster. One try was in
conjunction with his old captor, Ranjeet Singh, who was to capture Peshawar
while Shuja tried for Kandahar and Kabul. While the Sikhs took Peshawar without
much trouble, Shuja’s own assault ended in disaster and he was once again
forced to flee for his life back to his “court” in Ludhiana.
Meanwhile, in 1818, the simmering rivalry
between the Sadozai and Barakzai clans in Afghanistan had erupted into open
war, and the Sadozai ruler, Shah Mahmoud (Shuja’s half-brother, whom he had
defeated and then been defeated by) was expelled from most of what remained of
the kingdom, retaining only Herat on the Persian frontier. The rest of the Afghan
kingdom was then ruled by a group of Barakzai chieftains. One of these khans was
called Dost Mohammad, and he soon established himself as the pre-eminent of all
the Barakzais.
Dost Mohammad |
By any estimation, Dost Mohammad must rank
as one of the most remarkable characters in recent history. He was
half-Persian, his mother being a Qizilbash (Persian immigrant clan) of low
status, and worked his way up to prominence among the other Barakzais entirely
due to his own abilities. By 1826 he was de facto king of the Afghan Empire,
and had himself formally declared Amir–ul–Momineen (Leader of the Faithful) by
the mullahs in 1835, whereupon he declared a jihad against the Sikhs, who still
occupied Peshawar. It’s extremely unlikely that the very intelligent Dost Mohammad
actually believed his tribal levies could ever defeat the professional Sikh
army and retake Peshawar; the declaration of jihad was basically a move to
cement his position with the legitimacy of religion.
At this point it would be appropriate to
point out something: Afghan Islam of the time was not Taliban-style
ultra-fundamentalism. Afghan Islam was then strongly influenced by Indian Sufi
mysticism, and stayed that way until Western meddling in the late 1970s and
1980s brought in Saudi-style Wah’habism and selectively favoured intolerance
and religious bigotry. Jihad, therefore, did not mean regressive social mores
and the oppression of women; it merely meant a nationalistic war against an
infidel foreign invader (in this case the Sikhs).
Now, Dost Mohammad, like Shah Shuja before
him, was desperate for an alliance with the British. Meanwhile, the advancing
Russian Empire was also making overtures to him for an alliance, and in 1838 a
Russian agent called Ivan Vitkevitch appeared in Kabul attempting to negotiate
a treaty. But the British had their own agent in Kabul too, a Scottish
adventurer called Alexander Burnes, and Dost Mohammad markedly preferred him to
Vitkevitch, and openly asked for a British treaty.
When the news of Vitkevitch’s presence in
Afghanistan became known to the British, it set off an immediate reaction in
war-mongering circles of power. Fantastic tales were told of how a Russian army
might use Afghanistan as a base for invading British-controlled India, and how
in order to forestall this (utterly imaginary) Russian plan, Afghanistan must
be immediately brought under British control. British diplomats and politicians
who had never been to the country wrote books and pamphlets urging immediate
replacement of Dost Mohammad by a ruler more “favourable” to British interests.
War propaganda went into top gear. The
British ambassador in Tehran declared that anyone who was not for Britain was
against Britain. It was said that Dost Mohammad was trying to capture what was
not his – Peshawar – as though it had always been a Sikh possession and not
till very recently the Afghan winter capital. And again and again it was said
that unless Afghanistan was captured, the Russian army would sweep down into
the Indian plains.
Meanwhile, Burnes (who made no attempt to
hide his personal regard for Dost Mohammad) sent dispatches back to the British
capital in Calcutta stating that the Amir was popular among the Afghan people,
an efficient administrator, and favourably inclined towards Britain. But he was
ignored, as were other British agents in the country. Instead, the British
authorities preferred to believe a spymaster called Claude Wade, who never
visited Afghanistan but insisted that according to his intelligence sources
Dost Mohammad was hated by the Afghans, who pined for the return of a Sadozai
monarch. The only such monarch available was, of course, Shah Shuja, in his
court in exile in Ludhiana; a man who was a pensioner of the British and had
not visited Afghanistan in thirty years.
In other words, invading and occupying
Afghanistan wouldn’t just forestall the Russians (in fact, the Russians had
given up on their treaty, and Vitkevitch had gone home, so that “threat” was
past) but would be a humanitarian
intervention, giving the Afghan people the benevolent king they (allegedly) so
desperately wanted. Can you see where this is heading?
At this point I would like to stress
something. When I keep talking about the “British”, I mean not, primarily, the
British government, but a corporate entity – the megacorporation I mentioned,
called the East India Company. This East India Company, of course, operated –
like all companies – with only one aim, profit. To make this profit, it had three private armies of its own,
comprising both British units and British-officered Indian mercenary forces. Of
these three armies one – the so-called Bengal Army – was earmarked for the
invasion and subjugation of Afghanistan. But the East India Company was not on
its own in this; it had the complete support of the British military and
government, and in effect was acting a proxy for the British government in a
part of the world where Britain was not, at the time, a formal colonial power.
The agreements and aggressions that gained territory for the nascent British
Raj were committed by the East India Company, not by the British government –
though, of course, the two were connected at the hip.
The British wars of conquest in Hindustan
were the first corporate wars in history.
So, to get back to the story: in 1839, the
British (in the shape of Sir William Hay Macnaghten, a former Irish judge who
would play a central and disastrous role in events to come) informed Shah Shuja
– without making any attempt to consult him in advance – that they were about
to put him back on the throne of Afghanistan. Shuja had no troops, of course,
so a token force of mercenaries – Indians and Afghans settled in India – was to
be placed at his disposal, so that he didn’t look like even more of a British
puppet than he already was.
Macnaghten, or Lat Hay Jangi as the Afghans called him. |
The British then put together an invasion
force, called the Army of the Indus, comprising white soldiers, Indian
mercenaries, and “camp followers” (including the families of the Indian
mercenaries). After a long and arduous march, this army, with some difficulty,
managed to reach Afghanistan over the passes of the Khyber, fighting off
constant ambushes by Balochi tribesmen as well as lack of food and water.
Once in Afghanistan, though, their technological superiority and training told; they easily defeated the Afghan tribal levies and took the great fortress of Ghazni with only a few hours’ fighting. When the news of this disaster reached Kabul, Dost Mohammad and his family fled north, looking for support among the northern tribes. But they saw which way the winds were blowing and rapidly changed sides, and Dost Mohammad was forced to flee further, finally reaching Bukhara, where he and the most effective of his sons, Akbar Khan, were imprisoned by the local shah.
Balochi ambush |
Once in Afghanistan, though, their technological superiority and training told; they easily defeated the Afghan tribal levies and took the great fortress of Ghazni with only a few hours’ fighting. When the news of this disaster reached Kabul, Dost Mohammad and his family fled north, looking for support among the northern tribes. But they saw which way the winds were blowing and rapidly changed sides, and Dost Mohammad was forced to flee further, finally reaching Bukhara, where he and the most effective of his sons, Akbar Khan, were imprisoned by the local shah.
With Dost Mohammad’s departure, resistance
collapsed, the various tribal chiefs vying with each other to declare their
loyalty to Shah Shuja. In August 1839, the British took Kabul without a shot
and put Shuja back in his old fortified palace at the Bala Hisar. However, he
was never anything more than a British puppet, and the people of Kabul were
aware of it from the start. The British even replaced his wazir, Mullah Shakur
Ishakzai, who had been with him through the decades of exile, because he wasn’t
pro-British enough; they replaced him with a corrupt nonentity hated by all
Afghans, but especially the nobility.
Among the occupiers of Kabul at this time
was Alexander Burnes, who – once the decision had been made to overthrow Dost
Mohammad – had changed sides and gone over to the pro-Shuja camp of British
opinion, and had accordingly been rewarded with a knighthood. (Burnes’ Kashmiri
secretary, Mohan Lal, was also in Kabul. Mohan Lal was an extremely intelligent
and fluently multilingual man who knew Afghanistan well and gave excellent
advice, which was followed less and less as time went on.) He and other British
civilians rented houses in Kabul, while the army of occupation set up a
cantonment on flat ground near the city. This cantonment was atrociously
situated, being overlooked by hills on all sides, but was persisted with – because too much money had been spent on it
to be wasted.
Alexander Burnes, not in disguise and (below) in disguise |
All this enraged, among others, a young pro-Shuja
tribal khan called Abdullah Achakzai. The embittered Achakzai, who had always
opposed Dost Mohammad and the Barakzais, would become one of the early leaders
of the anti-British rebellion.
Far more damage to the occupation was done
by the fact that it was always a horrendously uneconomical proposition. Afghans
were too poor to pay for their own enslavement, so the entire expenses of the
occupation – and of the puppet government of Shuja – had to be borne by the
East India Company in Calcutta. The funds of the Company were running so low
that it had to borrow from the moneylenders of Calcutta to finance the
occupation of Afghanistan; and it ordered the occupation forces to cut down on
expenses.
William Hay Macnaghten, who was officially
the Envoy (meaning ambassador) of the East India Company to Shuja’s court, was
in reality now in all but name the dictator of Afghanistan. He decided to do
this cutting down on expenses by reducing and then eliminating the payments
made to the various tribal chiefs and warlords. This was a monumentally
disastrous decision, because it was only these payments that had held the
warlords back from resisting the occupation. The Ghilzai tribal chiefs who
lived along the southern frontier were especially livid, because they had
ensured that the caravans which brought every bit of equipment and provisions
the British depended on for their troops and civilians got through the passes
unscathed. Even Shah Shuja’s allowance was curtailed.
Instead of the tribal militias run by
warlords, Macnaghten and his advisors decided on an Afghan National Army, to be
raised, trained, armed and officered by the British, to be nominally under
Shuja, but – since Shuja, as everyone knew, was a puppet who did not dare
emerge from his fortified palace at Bala Hisar – in reality to be subservient
to British interests. The warlords accurately took this as a second threat, to
be countered by all means possible.
Another measure taken was to increase
revenue to the maximum level possible. Hence, the tribal chiefs (whose payments
had been cut) were asked to increase their tax collections – which would,
naturally, go to the infidel occupation forces. Another pro-Sadozai noble,
Aminullah Khan Logari, would become the other great early leader of the
rebellion, after being stripped of his district because he refused to increase
the taxes he levied on the people.
Soon enough, rebellions were breaking out
in the countryside, and Dost Mohammad (who had escaped from his confinement in
Bukhara) was leading his own, increasingly effective, insurgency. However, in
November 1840, after eighteen months on the run, Dost Mohammad surrendered
personally to Macnaghten and was sent off to exile in India. Dost Mohammad’s
decision to surrender was meant to disarm any British bounty which might cause
his followers to betray him and hand him over to the tender mercies of Shuja.
In fact, Shuja – who was rather fond of mutilating his own household staff for
minor infractions – was infuriated at the British refusal to hand over Dost
Mohammad for blinding, torture and execution.
Dost Mohammad’s surrender, of course,
didn’t mean the end of the insurgency, since he only led a small part of it. By
now the clerics had also joined in the fight – among them two influential
brothers, Mir Haji and Mir Masjidi. These two were Shuja loyalists who had been
among the early defectors from Dost Mohammad’s government – and now, with the infidels
in power, they turned against them with a deadly hatred. Even so, the British
might have defused the situation; Mir Masjidi had actually negotiated surrender
after a token rebellion. But the British, after
accepting his submission, destroyed his fort, murdered his family, and
distributed his lands among his rivals. Mir Masjidi promptly became the third
great pro-Shuja enemy of the British occupation.
As the resistance to the occupation grew by
the day, East India Company headquarters in Calcutta had not been idle. It had
been busy, actually, in starting a new war of choice – it invaded China in the
First Opium War, designed to compel the Chinese Empire to buy the opium the
British were forcing Indian peasants to grow instead of food. In order to fight
this war, the Company withdrew part of the occupation forces in Afghanistan back
to India. So it was distracted by one war, while allowing another to run
towards disaster through incompetence, underfunding and imperialistic
arrogance.
The arrogance was clear. “The Afghans are
children,” the British declared. And, apparently, like children they were to be
chastised in order to behave.
By October 1841, this chastisement was
plainly beyond the capacity of the British. The country was in open revolt, yet
Macnaghten kept sending deliriously optimistic reports back to Calcutta, saying
everything was fine and rejecting all reports to the contrary as rumour mongering.
The probable reason was that he was about to be rewarded for his service in
Afghanistan by being made the governor of Bombay, and he wanted to leave any
possible mess for his successor to clean up. He could not afford to be seen to
have failed at this stage of proceedings.
Macnaghten was a civilian, but he did have
an army, and that army had a military commander. This was an aged and infirm
general called Elphinstone, who had come out of retirement due to financial
constraints, and who was ill, incompetent and incapable. Elphinstone’s
subordinates were not much better; contemptuous of the Afghans and of their own
Indian troops, and in many cases of their white troops as well, they also
resented the presence of “Queen’s officers” – regular British Army officers,
who were paid more and placed in higher positions than the “Company’s officers”
of the mercenary Bengal Army. So the British were incompetently led, filled
with dissension, racism, classism, and resentment – not the best of condition
in which to face up to an insurrection.
It should be understood that at this stage the
insurrection was not against Shah
Shuja, who was considered a puppet in British hands, but against the foreign
infidel occupation. The nobles pressed Shuja to eject the British, but he had
neither the ability to do so, nor the desire, after being their pensioner for
so many years, to set himself at odds with them. Nor was the insurrection
united under a single command; each rebellious tribal group had its own
leaders, who had their own aims and objectives. Some wanted to force out the
British and give Shah Shuja the power he had been denied by the foreign
occupiers. Some wanted their payments to be resumed. Some others wanted Dost
Mohammad back. Yet others wanted revenge for the insults suffered at British
hands. Some were jihadists. There was almost no cooperation among them, and no
grand strategy; but to the British they all seemed one single, unified mass.
The spark that set off the final explosion
involved, coincidentally, Burnes himself. On 1st November 1841, a
woman from Abdullah Achakzai’s household (either a slave girl or Achakzai’s
mistress) ran away to Burnes’ house. Achakzai sent a messenger to fetch her
back, but Burnes had the messenger beaten up and thrown out. Achakzai called a
tribal council and declared that this was an intolerable insult. By the next morning,
the capital was in flames as marauding militias attacked the British, their
Indian mercenaries, and any pro-British Afghans they could find. Burnes was
surrounded in his house by a mob and lynched along with some other British
officers. Despite message after message he sent pleading for help, the British
in the cantonment made no attempt to rescue him. His secretary, Mohan Lal,
survived only because he was hidden by sympathetic Afghans.
Shah Shuja sent messages asking his British
allies to withdraw to the fortified palace at Bala Hisar, but – because the cantonment
had been built at such great cost – the British refused to evacuate it. Shuja
himself, though treated with contempt and disdain by Macnaghten and the rest of
the occupation, was the only one to respond militarily, using a thousand troops
of his personal guard (known as Shah Shuja’s Contingent) under the leadership
of his son Prince Fatteh Jang in an effort to rescue Burnes (who had openly
been contemptuous of Shuja in the past and who was at that time still alive and
sending desperate pleas for help) and suppress the revolt. This attempt failed –
the soldiers got enmeshed in vicious street fighting, were pinned down by
snipers on rooftops, and withdrew after losing a tenth of their number and both
their artillery pieces – but it was still the only attempt to suppress the revolt, and it came not from the
British but from Shuja.
Over the next weeks, the British lost their
positions one by one, ultimately being forced to fall back on the cantonment. Their
supplies were largely kept in surrounding forts, and over the next days the
rebel militias overran these one by one, until the British were cut off and starving.
They did have one success – as it appeared at the time – when on 23rd
November both Mir Masjidi and Abdullah Achakzai were killed in the course of a
battle. (There is reason to believe that Achakzai was killed not by the British
but by one of his own people who had been bought over by Mohan Lal. If so, it
was a disastrous move in the long term.)
It was a disastrous move because while
Achakzai and Mir Masjidi were opponents of the occupation, they were basically
just hotheads; their grievances were immediate and could have been easily
resolved. They were also both Sadozai loyalists, committed to Shuja, who was
himself committed to his British ex-benefactors; and not exactly military
geniuses either. Removing them from the scene did not improve the prospects of
peace.
It merely left the way open for an
infinitely more formidable opponent, who now arrived and took control of
proceedings.
When Dost Mohammad had escaped from his
imprisonment in Bukhara to begin his anti-British insurgency, his son Akbar
Khan had remained in custody. At the intercessions of various Afghan nobles, he
had been released at the start of the rebellion, and now he arrived to take
charge, at the head of a small force provided by northern Kohistani tribes.
Vastly more intelligent, energetic and militarily talented than the two killed
pro-Sadozai leaders, he was also no Shuja supporter. With him at the helm, the
anti-British rebellion inevitably morphed into an anti-Shuja rebellion as well.
Akbar Khan |
Step by step, during the month of December
1841, Akbar Khan (who was, at the time, just 25 years old) consolidated the
siege around the Kabul cantonment, completely cutting it off from any source of
sustenance. His snipers, with their long jezail rifles (which easily outranged
the British Brown Bess muskets) picked off soldiers from the hills surrounding
the cantonment. He even manhandled captured artillery pieces to the top of the
hills to begin bombarding the British camp. With winter approaching, the
British had no hope of help from India, and the other two remaining bases in
Afghanistan – Kandahar and Jalalabad – were also isolated and besieged.
Macnaghten’s army officers, by now finally
realising that the rebellion was actually a serious matter, decided to start
negotiations on a withdrawal of British forces – leaving Shuja, whom the
British were officially there to protect, stranded high and dry. This was
despite the fact that Macnaghten himself strongly opposed abandoning Shuja and even
though Shuja had stayed remarkably loyal to the British, at the cost of earning
the hatred of the people he ruled over. And, just as Shuja wasn’t consulted
before being put back on his throne by the British, he wasn’t consulted before
the British pulled the plug on him.
At the same time, Macnaghten tried a
typical piece of British trickery. In negotiations with Akbar Khan, he agreed
that the British would pay an indemnity to the tribal chiefs, surrender their
artillery, and withdraw from Afghanistan on 14th December, with Dost
Mohammad released from imprisonment and allowed to return to the throne. Shah
Shuja could stay on as a private citizen or go back with the British, as he
wished. (All this, of course, was without any reference to Shuja himself, or
any thought about what he wanted.) Yet – at the same time – he, through Mohan
Lal, attempted to pay off tribal leaders to defect to the British side and to
murder rebel leaders. These intrigues swiftly became known to Akbar Khan, who
tricked Macnaghten into a written offer to kill Aminullah Khan Logari in return
for a cash payment and a British alliance. With the letter as proof of
Macnaghten’s duplicity, Akbar Khan felt no compunction about killing the Envoy
during the course of a meeting and taking his aides prisoner. Macnaghten’s
corpse was beheaded and hung from a hook in the Kabul market – so great was the
extent of hatred the Afghan “children” bore for their British occupiers.
With Macnaghten dead, all hope for hanging
on to Kabul was obviously gone, and the final retreat began on the morning of 6th
January, the starving British soldiers, Indian mercenaries, and their varied
camp followers (including British and Indian women and children) struggling
through deep snow, repeatedly ambushed by bodies of Afghan tribesmen. Akbar
Khan was to have arranged safe passage for them, but he did no such thing. Not
that he would have got far if he had, because the retreat was through Ghilzai
country, and the fiercely independent Ghilzai had no great love for either the
Sadozai or the Barakzai. Besides, ever since their payments had been stopped,
they had intense private grudges against the British to work off.
The objective of the retreat was the
British garrison at Jalalabad, But Jalalabad wasn’t just far off – it was
itself besieged and unable to send any help. And the retreating British column
disintegrated in the snow, the Indian mercenaries freezing to death in large
numbers or surrendering to the Afghans, while their British officers not
infrequently abandoned them to their fate in an effort to save themselves.
Soon, the British commanders were either dead or in captivity, and the last
military remnant (of the 44th Foot regiment) of the Army of the
Indus was annihilated in a hopeless stand at the top of a hill in Gandamak.
Only one of these men survived to be taken prisoner |
In
the end, only one British member of the Kabul garrison, Dr Brydon, managed to
get through to Jalalabad. A few Indian mercenaries managed to trickle in, too,
but in popular British imagination to this day the only survivor of the retreat
was Dr Brydon – even though large numbers of British and Indians had been taken
captive or were dispersed, freezing and starving, in the hills along the route.
The alleged sole survivor |
With the sudden end of the British presence in
Kabul, a rather strange and unexpected thing happened. Shuja’s government did
not immediately collapse; instead, his popularity saw a sudden surge, and many
of the nobles, including Barakzai rivals of Dost Mohammad, swore fealty to him.
They were aided in this by the fact that Akbar Khan, instead of returning to
Kabul to dabble in politics, followed the retreating British to Jalalabad and
was busy organising the siege of that city. Shuja still didn’t dare leave his
fortified palace, but did start preparing to fight Akbar Khan, who was now his
enemy. The war against the British was fast turning into a civil war.
Among Shuja’s advisors at this time were
Aminullah Logari, one of the original leaders of the rebellion, and Zaman Khan Barakzai,
Akbar Khan’s cousin, who had assumed the formal leadership of the rebellion
until being supplanted by Akbar. He therefore had reasons to hate his cousin,
and by February 1842 he was acting as Shuja’s wazir. He was also a rival of his
former vassal Aminullah Logari, and this rivalry would have profound effects in
the not very distant future.
Akbar Khan himself had other things to
worry about. Unlike Kabul, Jalalabad lies in the plains, and is a far harder
problem for a force lacking artillery and proper organisation. As the Western-backed
Mujahideen were to discover a century and a half later, a frontal assault
against Jalalabad is tantamount to suicide. And in open warfare, the British –
whose commanders in Jalalabad were far more competent than in Kabul – were still
capable of defeating anything the Afghans could put up against them.
Meanwhile, the news of the catastrophe in
Kabul had reached the British in India. They had already written off the Afghan
occupation as unviable, but decided that the Afghans must be punished for
daring to rise up in arms against the occupation. They therefore set about
creating another invasion army, called the Army of Retribution, to avenge the
Army of the Indus. By the summer of 1842, it was fighting its way up the passes
towards Jalalabad, routing the Ghilzai irregulars who attempted to combat it.
Faced with these facts, Akbar Khan took a
leaf out of his father’s book and declared a jihad, imploring all true Muslims
to come to his aid. This put immense pressure on Shuja, with the late Mir
Masjidi’s brother Mir Haji leading the mullahs in their demands that the king
join in the jihad to oust the British from Jalalabad and Kandahar. Shuja waited
as long as he could, in the desperate hope that the Army of Retribution would
arrive and save him from his dilemma, but eventually he had reached the end of
his tether. On 4th April he finally decided to leave at the head of
his army on the following morning, and in a function designed to ensure the
support of Aminullah Logari and other nobles, he gave them many rich honours. But he completely neglected to give anything
to the family of Zaman Khan Barakzai.
This infuriated Zaman Khan’s son, Shuja
(named after the king himself), who took it as an insult to the Barakzai clan.
As Shah Shuja left to meet his army on the morning of 5th April, Shuja
Barakzai and his men ambushed him and shot him dead as he tried to flee,
injured and bleeding, across the fields on foot. With Shah Shuja dead as a
result of a fit of pique, all hope of the Sadozais clinging on to power came to
an end, though Fatteh Jang (Shuja’s son, who had made an attempt to rescue
Burnes) was crowned king.
Meanwhile, the Army of Retribution broke
the siege of Jalalabad, and Akbar Khan (who had been injured in another insider
attempt on his life, this one arranged by Shuja) had to flee back to Kabul.
Once there, he turned his forces on the Bala Hisar fort where Fatteh Jang was
holed up, and after capturing the place had the new king make him the wazir.
Fatteh Jang, in effect, became Akbar Khan’s prisoner, compelled to do his
bidding in everything.
Among Akbar Khan’s captives in Kabul was
Mohan Lal, who had repeatedly spent his own money in an effort to serve British
interests; at first, to have Afghan leaders killed, and then to buy the freedom
of British hostages. The Afghans, who had been long aware of his activities,
now began coercing him for money, having him tortured. Mohan Lal wrote many
letters to the British in Jalalabad begging for money to save his life, but
there was no response. The only aid he got was from a colleague of his,
Shahamat Ali, who from Indore in Central India raised enough cash to have him
released. (Later on, Mohan Lal travelled to England in a desperate attempt to
have the East India Company reimburse the 79,496 rupees he had spent in the
Company’s interests – a large sum even to this day, let alone in 1842. Not only
did he not get the money, he was never employed by the Company again, and ended
his life deep in debt, poverty and obscurity.)
Early in September 1842, the Army of Retribution finally broke out of Jalalabad and set out on the road to Kabul, destroying everything they could find on the journey. Entire villages of civilians were murdered on the merest whim; one particular town was destroyed simply because it was rumoured that Akbar Khan had enjoyed visiting it. So wanton was the destruction that even some of the British were sickened by it, but the “honour” of the British Empire demanded that the insolent Afghans be punished, so they were. About the same time, the British garrison in Kandahar also began marching on Kabul, committing its own share of war crimes on the way.
On 15th September, the British
finally took Kabul, finding it to have been abandoned by Akbar Khan and the
majority of the population. Only the Hindu trading community of Kabul and the
ethnic Persians (Qizilbashis) remained in any number, reasoning that they had
nothing to fear in a quarrel between the Pashtuns and the British. They were to
pay dearly for this blunder.
On arrival in Kabul, the British and their
Indian mercenaries began a programme of plunder, murder and destruction that dwarfed
anything they had done so far. Virtually
the entire city was burned down, corpses littering the streets, and the five
hundred Hindu trading families (who had fed and sheltered many Indian
mercenaries and British fugitives during the rebellion) being made destitute in
a matter of 48 hours. The Qizilbashis would have met the same fate had they not
taken to arms and guarded their quarter against the new invaders. The great
market of Kabul was blown up simply because Macnaghten’s corpse had been
displayed there. Only the Bala Hisar fort was spared, because Fatteh Jang
needed a place to call home; but the British flag flew over it.
Akbar Khan had treated the British captives
well, and around this time the prominent prisoners – those of them as were
still alive (General Elphinstone had died in captivity) – bribed their way out
of confinement and rejoined the army in Kabul. But many others, mostly Indian
mercenaries but also some English soldiers and camp followers, remained
imprisoned in the hill villages and slave markets of Central Asia. These would
all be left to their fate.
From Kabul, expeditionary forces moved out
north, destroying more places to make the ruin as complete as possible. All
this, of course, was primarily aimed at civilians, who had had nothing to do
with the anti-British rebellion and had neither the resources to resist nor the
ability to escape.
All the while, the popular assumption in
Afghanistan was that the British would resume their occupation – they had kept
their plans to withdraw a carefully guarded secret. So some of the Afghan warlords had switched
their allegiance back to the British, and they – along with Fatteh Jang – were shocked
when, without warning, the British announced their decision to pull out,
leaving them stranded and helpless in the face of Akbar Khan’s retribution.
On 12th October the British
withdrew from Kabul, as the first snows fell. With them went Fatteh Jang, who
had no stomach to face Akbar Khan. On 27th October the British quit
Jalalabad, where they had held out for so long, dynamiting the fort to destroy everything
as completely as possible. Behind them they left a devastated country, full of
people who hated them more than ever, and with even greater cause than ever
before.
The Afghan war of choice was over. The
British had gained exactly nothing from it. British media were now busy blaming
the defeat on the Russians – one of the factors which would lead to Britain and
Russia going to war a decade later.
And now, in a final piece of irony, the exact same government which the war had
been started to overthrow was back in power.
After the death of Shah Shuja, Dost
Mohammad had been released from his Indian exile and informed that he could
return to his throne if he felt like it. He went back to Kabul, where Akbar
Khan – as wazir – personally welcomed him, and where he proceeded to rule for
many years. He proved an extremely effective ruler, expanding the borders of
his kingdom to what are essentially the frontiers of the modern state of
Afghanistan. He even managed to control the Ghilzais, and died in 1863 after
finally conquering Herat, which had remained under Sadozai control since 1818. Today,
he and Akbar Khan are deeply venerated figures in Afghan history, while poor
Shuja, a tragic figure if there ever was one, is reviled as a traitor and a
puppet. And the Barakzai dynasty hung on till the 1970s, when the last king,
Zahir Shah, was overthrown in a coup.
That, essentially, is the story of the
First British-Afghan War (the one now going on is the third; the British invaded Afghanistan again in the 1870s, again
crushed Afghan armies on the battlefield, and again withdrew in the face of
resistance). It is also the story told (in much, much greater detail than I
have recounted it here) in Dalrymple’s book (which I will just say should be
required reading for any student of current affairs; I’ll give it five stars
but at the same time warn that its size and weight mean you need strong wrists
and a longer attention span than a mayfly.)
Readers who have a sense of history and
follow the news will, of course, immediately make the comparison between the
events of 1839-42 and today. Some I have spoken of at the start of this
article. Others can readily be inferred, for instance:
-
The idea that the only
anti-occupation resistance is the Taliban, which is a monolithic force. In
reality it comprises a whole lot of distinct outfits, including the Haqqanis,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s group, the various fractured movements which call
themselves the Taliban, and many, many people who are not part of any of these
but have rebelled for other reasons. Some have suffered directly at the hands
of the occupation, and seen their friends and relatives killed. Some others are
in rebellion against the incredibly corrupt government foisted on them by the
British and Americans. Different people with different reasons for revolt will not stop fighting if given the same things.
-
Imperial hubris. The British
could have signed a treaty with Dost Mohammad and averted the invasion
completely. The Americans could have negotiated with the Taliban to hand over
Osama bin Laden. In both cases, the Afghan government targeted for regime
change was eager to negotiate; it was the foreign imperialist nation which
refused and began a war of choice.
-
Invading Afghanistan is easy but getting out hard. Both the 1839 and 2001 regime
change operations in Kabul proceeded easily to begin with, but rapidly bogged
down, and the puppet rulers had no legitimacy with the people because of their perceived
closeness to the occupation. Meanwhile, in reality, the puppets and the
occupation had an uneasy, almost adversarial relationship, and the puppets increasingly
had to take an anti-occupation line even to survive.
-
The reluctance to believe that
the people of the country can possibly resent being occupied, and fight back
against the occupation unless they are “bad guys” who deserve mass punishment.
- That ability to destroy any
Afghan resistance in a pitched battle does not translate into victory in the
long run.
-
That a prematurely declared
victory and starting another war of choice while still embroiled in Afghanistan
is not a good idea, and never was.
-
That Afghan occupations tend to
be economically disastrous for the occupier.
-
It isn’t true, as often
claimed, that the Afghans can’t be defeated. In fact, they can be defeated
rather easily by any organised force. What they can’t be is conquered, a fact of infinitely greater
importance. No occupation can be translated into exploitation if the people do
not cooperate in their own slavery. Indians have always been eager to bow down
before foreign occupiers, and so have been easily enslaved by relatively small
groups of foreigners. Afghans have always resisted, constantly, thus finally
exhausting and expelling all invaders.
The parallels are actually even more
interesting than I’ve spoken of here, to the point where one might think we’re
talking of an episode of Ripley’s Believe
It Or Not. For example:
-
The current main American base
in Kabul is situated on the exact same
site as the 1839 British cantonment.
-
One of the British bases
overrun before the fighting started in Kabul was at Charikar. What about it?
Well, Charikar is just about where the American air base at Bagram lies today.
-
The American-installed Afghan
puppet ruler, Hamid Karzai, was an employee of the UNOCAL company for many
years, and had never visited Afghanistan during this period. He is also a Popalzai. And so what? This:
Shuja and his Sadozai dynasty were
Popalzais.
-
The greatest resistance to the
British invasion came from the Ghilzais, and especially the Hotak clan. The
core of the Taliban has always been Ghilzai, and Mullah Omar is a Hotak Ghilzai.
Of course there are differences; the
Taliban possess nowhere near the uniting ability of the Barakzais or even the
Sadozais. Their brand of Islam is alien to Afghanistan, and is an import of
Saudi fundamentalism. The support they get isn’t because they are popular, but
because they are less bad than the puppet regime in Kabul, its pet warlords and
the brutal occupation forces. But, as any reading of the news shows, they are
well on the way to being a powerful component of any future Kabul government.
The more things change, in Afghanistan, the
more they end up remaining the same.
Another thing – and this is my personal
observation:
The British, in the wake of their defeat
and the retreat from Kabul, blamed the “treachery” of the Afghans. So do the
current occupiers, as the occupation founders, blame the Afghans for being “ungrateful”
for being “liberated” from the Taliban.
All right, let’s say Akbar Khan was treacherous in reneging on his
promise to give the British safe passage out of Kabul. Well, let’s just see the
number of people the British themselves double-crossed during the same period,
for comparison purposes, you understand:
First, Dost Mohammad, who lost his empire through no fault of his own.
All through the 1830s, he kept trying hard for a British alliance, rejecting the
Russians – and all he got for his pains was to be invaded on completely
fictional grounds.
Second, Shah Shuja, who was placed in power, turned into a pathetic rubber
stamp, and then left to sink or swim on his own when the British withdrew.
Third, the Afghan warlords who had worked for the invaders in return for
cash payments, and who found their stipends abruptly cut.
Fourth, Mir Masjidi, whose fort was destroyed, family murdered, and lands
seized after he’d negotiated surrender.
Fifth, Alexander Burnes, who was left to be lynched by the mob when he
could easily have been saved.
Sixth, Mohan Lal, who ruined himself in the Company’s service and got
nothing at all in return.
Seventh, the Hindu trading families of Kabul, who stayed to welcome the
British and were destroyed by them in consequence.
Eighth, Fatteh Jang and the other pro-British Kabul nobles, who were
abandoned by the British as they withdrew for the second time.
Ninth, the Indian mercenaries who were taken prisoner by the Afghans and
were abandoned to their fate by the British after they took Kabul.
Tenth, the attempt by Macnaghten to double cross the Afghans while
allegedly negotiating with them in good faith.
I have probably left out some more
instances of British perfidy, but all in all, it doesn’t speak too highly of
the alleged “good” side in the conflict.
So why does this ancient history
matter? It
matters because the Afghans are Asians, and like most Asians they have
long,
long memories. The occupation and defeat in Afghanistan was only a blip
on the
British imperial radar, but to this day the Afghans know the history of
the war
in great detail. It was, as Dalrymple said, their "Waterloo, Trafalgar
and Battle of Britain" rolled into one. They can see the parallels for
themselves, and know that history
is on their side, just as long as they outlast the occupation. And, this
knowledge gives them the strength to outlast the occupation.
I’ll end with a question from an Afghan
chieftain, Mehrab Khan, made during the 1839 invasion to Alexander Burnes, as
quoted on Page 161 of Dalrymple’s book.
“You have brought an army into the country,”
he said. “But how do you propose to take it out again?”
Copyright B Purkayastha 2013
Tuesday, 5 February 2013
Jogodish and the Jombie: A Tale from Bunglistan
Jogodish
Babu was returning from Mitro Moshai’s adda
the evening the Zombie Apocalypse struck Bunglistan.
Jogodish Babu’s full and complete name was
Jogodish Chondro Bondopadhyay, and if his friends from his schooldays had once called
him Jogai, nobody cared to remember it now. Jogodish Babu was sensitive about
that. If they didn’t call him Jogodish Shaheb, the least they could do was call
him Jogodish Babu. As he said, many times, “I am an ofisaar now. Ebhryone
should treat me weeth respect.” And – at least to his face – everyone did,
except his wife. But then Jogodish Babu’s wife had never respected him anyway.
And she addressed him, of course, by no name at all.
She wasn’t a wife fit to live with anyone, Jogodish Babu had often thought. For one thing, she outweighed him by a good twenty kilos and had a voice like a broken cement mixer on steroids. For another, she had opinions on everything and wasn’t shy to express them, at the top of her considerable lung-power, at all hours of the day and night. For a third, she resented everything about him, starting with his salary and going on to the fact that he never went with her to her mother’s for a holiday during the Durga Puja. Jogodish Babu could never explain that he needed a holiday from her, and the two weeks she was gone to Callcutter represented the only free time of his life. He was terrified that the old woman would die and then his wife wouldn’t go away at all.
It wouldn’t matter so much, Jogodish Babu
had often thought, if she’d at least let him alone to live his life the way he
saw fit. No, she had to run not just her life but his, and if they’d had a
child she’d have run the kid’s life as well. She even ran the neighbours’
lives, and though they laughed at her behind her back, when she gave “advice” that
sounded like orders, they nodded weakly and did as they were told.
Still and all, Jogodish Babu had had a good
evening till that moment when the Zombocalypse struck. The work at the office
had gone as usual, which is to say that he had blown the dust off a couple of
folders and poked around their contents before putting them back on the shelf
and calling for tea. He’d come home by five in the afternoon, changed, and gone
to the market down the street. There he’d bought a nice three-quarter kilogram
hilsa, redolent of the fishmonger’s slab, come back home and handed it over to
his wife. She had yelled at him because he hadn’t had the fishmonger scale and
chop up the fish, but not too much, because she adored hilsa and would eat
almost all of it herself anyway.
So Jogodish Babu had some more tea, and,
picking up his long umbrella in case it rained, went along to Mitro Moshai’s
house for the adda. His wife
screeched at him for going out again, but this was the one point on which he
never budged. If it wasn’t for the adda,
he’d go barking crazy.
Mitro Moshai lived in the next lane from
Jogodish Babu, and was the only one around who still held adda sessions, during which he kept mourning the passing of the
entire adda tradition. “Eet eej thees
telebheeshon,” he would say waggling his shiny bald head. “Eet eej ruining awar
kalchaar. That eej why we habh nobody like Kobigooroo Robi Thakur nowadayj.”
Actually, Jogodish Babu rather liked television, when he could get to
watch any in between his wife’s staple diet of Bunglee soaps and reality shows
where pudgy contestants in brightly coloured saris threw rings at bottles while
vacuous faced studio audiences dutifully clapped. But he would never, ever,
dare to say any such thing to Mitro Moshai.
One day, Haru the Boor had had the colossal
effrontery to mention television in favourable terms at the adda, and compounded the crime by saying
he’d watched a Bunglee pop group which had set one of Tagore’s songs –
“Robindro Shongeet” – to a catchy modern tune. Mitro Moshai had gone ballistic.
But Haru was a boor, so he didn’t back down, and there was a moment when it
seemed the two of them would come to blows.
It hadn’t stopped far short of physical
violence though. “Old fool,” Haru the Boor had muttered, deliberately pitching
his voice just loud enough to be heard.
“What was that?” Motro Moshai had yelled.
“Rascal!” he’d shouted, pointing with a trembling finger. “Look, he eej showing
me red red eyes.”
“You are,” Haru the Boor had groped for an
adequate term of abuse and finally found one, “...an eccentric. You should be in a lunatic asylum.”
“You...” Mitro Moshai had paused
dramatically and then delivered the Ultimate Insult. “You nonsense!”
“Ar
shala parchchi na,” Haru the Boor had declared. “I’m fed up with this.”
He’d stormed out, and had never come to Mitro Moshai’s adda again, even though his leaving meant there were only five of
them left and without Haru the Boor’s colourful tales there was little enough
to talk about anyway.
No, Jogodish Babu couldn’t mention TV. Hell,
as far as Mitro Moshai was concerned, it was bad enough that he wore trousers
instead of a dhoti. But this evening, the old man had been in an excellent mood
for some reason, and had even fetched out his ancient harmonium for Jogodish
Babu to play. The harmonium was old and dusty and the accordion flap was
cracked and leaking air, but it was still a harmonium, and Jogodish Babu’s wife
had long since forbidden the house to one. So Jogodish Babu had happily flapped
the accordion with one hand while pressing the keys with another and yelling
out Robindro Shongeets as the top of his voice, until he could no more and the
time had come to go on home.
“I’ll see you on Saturday,” he’d said,
polishing his spectacles on his kurta hem.
“Bee careful,” Mitro Moshai had told him.
“Saambody waas saying saamthing about riots aarlier. Today eej market day, and
these bhillage people like to cause trouble.”
Jogodish Babu nodded. “I also haard this
talk,” he lied, in case anyone might think he wasn’t in the know. Picking up
his umbrella, he nodded at Mitro Moshai and began walking home. The evening was
fairly advanced and the lane totally dark because there were no street lights, and
Jogodish Babu, conscious of the open ditch along the opposite side, kept to the
centre of the street, and stepped carefully over the potholes. He was very
happy at the thought of the oily, mustard-laden hilsa curry his wife would have
ready by now. Nobody cooked hilsa oilier or with more eye-watering amounts of
mustard than she did. He licked his lips in anticipation.
As he was negotiating a particularly broken
patch of street, he saw a figure up ahead, lurching from one side to another
and waving its hands distractedly around. “Drunkaard,” Jogodish Babu diagnosed,
and having no desire to get too close to the alcohol-addled one, he stepped
behind the tall palm tree which grew outside Old Uncle Horshobordhon’s house. The
silhouette, still lurching from side to side, passed, muttering to itself in a
language Jogodish Babu didn’t know – and he was an intellectual, amazingly
multi-lingual. After all, he could speak not just Bunglee but also English, and even
a smattering of Hindi. Why, just last month a Bihari cobbler had been amazed at
his Hindi. The man had even said he
was amazed. Jogodish Babu had proudly told everyone the story for days.
Strange, Jogodish Babu thought. But it was
probably a foreigner from South India or Punjab or somewhere like that, where
people were shameless enough to drink
– not like nice Bunglee boys who would never touch a drop. Jogodish Babu
shuddered at the thought of what his wife would do to him if wine – all alcohol
was “wine” to him – ever touched his lips.
Be that as it may, the foreign drunkard had
moved on, so Jogodish Babu came out from behind the tree and turned into the
stretch of main road which lay between Mitro Moshai’s lane and his, wondering
if there might be other drunkards around. But everything seemed as usual. The
shop where he usually bought groceries was about to close, but the owner’s son
was in charge for the week, and the boy was lazy. Well, Jogodish Babu thought,
he was only a baby. He would learn in time.
He was somewhat surprised when he entered
his own lane. At this hour, it was normally dark and lonely, but a knot of
people were gathered not far from the entrance to his house, craning to look at
something. Jogodish Babu was far from immune to the lure of curiosity, so he
joined the group and went up on his toes to try and see over the nearest
shoulder.
A man was sprawled in the centre of the
circle of onlookers, arms and legs flung randomly around. Dead, or fainted, or
just another drunkard?
“Maardar,” people in the crowd were saying.
“Call the pulish.”
“We called the pulish,” someone else said.
“They said they weel caam.”
“Who is he?” The light was so poor that it
wasn’t easy to make anything out, but Jogodish Babu could see that he was
wearing a plaid lungi and a yellow kurta, with a skull cap on his head. A
Muslim, then, and from his clothing, one of the working class. He was probably
from the slum down near the big mosque on the other side of the railway
station.
“Saambody said heej name eej Ghofoor Miyan,”
Haldar from two doors down replied. “Baat another paarson said eet cannot be
Ghofoor Miyan because Ghofoor Miyan eej bhery seeck.”
“Ghofoor Miyan the barber?” Jogodish Babu
said, surprised. “I didn’t know he was ill.” But now that he thought of it, the
plaid lungi and yellow kurta were exactly what Ghofoor Miyan wore, day in and
day out. “I know him,” he said, pushing his way forward. “Let me see.”
“Don’t go,” Haldar grabbed him by the
sleeve and pulled him back. “He may habh died obh a deejeej and geebh it to you.”
“The pulish,” people exclaimed, and moved
aside. “The pulish are here.”
There were actually two separate teams of
police, coming from different directions. One was from the Nondipur police
station, and comprised a fat constable with a thin moustache, whom Jogodish
Babu knew by sight. The other was from the Goshaigonj police station, and was
represented by a thin constable with a fat moustache. They saw each other and
stopped.
“You
are here?” the fat constable asked. “Good, eet eej your case, your pulish
station’s jurisdiction.” Wiping his forehead with relief, he turned to go.
“Not so fast,” the Goshaigonj constable
yelled. “Tha bordaar of jurisdiction between Nondipur and Goshaigonj eej
halfway down this street. Eef dead body eej more than halfway eet eej Nondipur
jurisdiction.”
“How do we know whether eet eej halfway or
not?” the fat Nondipur constable demanded.
“We measure eet, of course. Then we know
whose jurisdiction eet eej.” The Goshaigonj policeman began hunting in his
pockets. “I weel go and fetch a measuring tape,” he said finally.
“Good idea,” the Nondipur representative
announced. “I weel get one too. Jaast in case yours eej not accurate.” Turning,
he waddled away.
Jogodish Babu turned back to the corpse.
The more he looked, the more familiar it seemed to be. He felt consumed with an
overwhelming need to discover whether it was actually Ghofoor Miyan or not. Shaking
off Haldar’s arm, he pushed forward.
“What are you doing?” The familiar voice
sent a chill down his spine. Jogodish Babu turned to see his wife bearing down
on him like a bulldozer. “You are not to get mixed up een these theengs. Caam
eenside at once. You heeyar me?”
“I...” Jogodish Babu was about to say
something more but at that moment he felt a tugging at the calf of his right
trouser leg. Glancing down, he saw the presumed corpse struggling up on its
knees. It was glaring up at his face and pulling at him with one free hand.
“Ghofoor Miyan!” Jogodish Babu exclaimed,
recognising the face. “I’m glad to see you aren’t dead. But isn’t eet shameful
for you to be drunk on the street like this? Whaat would your mullah shaheb
theenk eef he saw you?”
Ghofoor Miyan didn’t seem to care what
would happen if the mullah saw him. With a groan like someone with a terrible
hangover, he lurched forward and snapped at Jogodish Babu’s leg. If he had had
teeth he might have done some damage. His toothless gums, though, slipped off,
leaving only a smear of saliva.
“Chchi chchi,” Jogodish Babu exclaimed.
“Ees thees what happens when you dreenk too maach?” He tried to pull away, but
Ghofoor Miyan began to pull himself upright, using Jogodish Babu as a post. He
stank horribly, like a dead fish.
“Get off me!” Jogodish Babu had had enough.
Raising his umbrella, he poked Ghofoor Miyan hard in the chest with the
ferrule. Ghofoor Miyan stumbled back and fell over with a crash, and did not
move.
“You keeled heem!” Haldar exclaimed.
“Hindu man keeled Muslim,” people began to
say. “Bhery bhery bad. There weel be communal riot obhar thees.”
“I didn’t mean to –“ Jogodish Babu began to
protest, when his wife’s hand closed on his collar. “I told you to caam
inside,” she said. “Baat you nebhar listen, and see what happens.”
Just then the Nondipur constable arrived on
the scene, holding a large tape measure in a can. “What eej going on here?”
“Arrest heem,” a dozen voices answered.
“Thees man, he jaast keeled the dead body.”
“I nebhar deed.” Jogodish Babu was
half-strangled by the grip his wife had on his collar, so his voice was the
merest squeak. “I just poked heem with the umbrella...”
“Look,” someone said. “The dead body eej
alive.” Indeed. Ghofoor Miyan was showing signs of getting up again. He moaned,
grimaced and yowled as he clumsily got on his hands and knees.
“Be careful,” Jogodish Babu told the
constable. “He eej trying to bite.” But the constable, ignoring him, pushed
forward.
“Get up and caam weeth me,” he said, grabbing
Ghofoor Miyan by the shoulder. “You are causing trouble for ebhryone.”
Ghofoor Miyan rather seemed to welcome
being grabbed by the shoulder. He turned his head and kissed the constable’s
wrist. It took a moment for everyone to realise he was trying to gnaw the constable’s wrist, and only his
lack of teeth preventing him.
“Oh, you bokachoda,” the constable cursed,
and cracked Ghofoor Miyan over the skullcap with his baton, hard. Ghofoor Miyan lay down and did not
move. The policeman hefted his baton and hit him again. A little blood began to
leak on to the street.
People began to drift away, quickly and
unobtrusively. Nobody wanted to be around when the cop decided to arrest
someone for the murder he’d apparently just committed.
“Now
you come home,” Jogodish Babu’s wife ordered, pulling, and he went.
On the way he passed the Goshaigonj
constable coming with another tape measure.
“Let’s start measuring,” he said. “I want
to go back to the station and sleep.”
**********************
The next
morning the news was all over. The dead were rising.
“Jombies,” Haldar said, meeting Jogodish
Babu in the street as they both left for work. “That eej what they are called,
jombies.”
“Eet eej happening all obhar the waarld,”
Foni from the television repair shop said. But nobody paid any attention to him
because he was a “baby boy”, only eighteen years old.
“We are laacky,” Jogodish Babu pronounced. “Een
thees caantry only Muslims and Christians bury their dead. We Hindus baarn
them. So naan obh awar dead bodies caam back to life.” He didn’t speak very
happily. Last night his wife had kept nagging till midnight, condemning him for
going to see the dead body.
“You are supposed to be a bhodrolok, a
gentleman,” she had said. “Baat you go and act like street rabble, a chhotolok. You
nebhar care for what people say.”
“What do
people say?” Jogodish Babu had countered, most unwisely. “I saw many of them on
the street too. That means they are all chhotoloks as well, right?”
That had set off his wife like a firecracker. “You don’t care a thing
about me,” she had stormed. “I slave my fingers to the bone –“ she had waggled
her plump fingers in his face to demonstrate. “And ebhryone says I could habh
married maach better men, baat I settled for you. And thees eej the way you
treat me. Also-“
And so it had gone, on and on. Jogodish
Babu had not even managed to enjoy the hilsa curry. It had tasted of his wife’s
rancour. He wished he could kill her, but then with his luck she’d probably
kill him instead. And then he’d become a zombie.
Talking about zombies...
“Yes, thees proves awar Hindu kalchaar eej
best,” Haldar said now, happily. “Awar ancient scientists eenbhented
ebhrything, so they also knew about jombies and that we should baarn bodies. We
are not like America and Raashia and athar caantries wheech habh jombies
walking ebhrywhere.”
“The telebheeshon said,” Foni put in,
desperate to be noticed, “that eef a jombie bites you, you weel becaam one
too.”
“The gorment,” Haldar said, “has poot the
army and pulish on gaard outside these cemeteries, to shoot these jombies eef
they rise. Eef you break the head, they die paarmanently.” He snorted. “The gorment should ban these
Muslims and Christians from burying their dead. Eet eej a Hindu caantry, so
Hindu laws should be followed, no?”
Jogodish Babu didn’t reply. He was watching
a small party of young men walking down the lane. He recognised a couple of
them – local toughs who acted as the strong arm of the ruling Trinobhoji
Congress political party. The one in the lead looked at him and grinned broadly
with stained, worn teeth.
“Arey,” he said. “Jogodish Babu, no? We
were jaast caaming to see you.”
“What for?” Jogodish Babu found himself
suddenly alone. Foni and Haldar had both evaporated like the morning mist.
“What did you want?”
“You know about thees jombie problem?” The
goon smiled again, looking at Jogodish Babu like a long-lost friend. “What am I
saying, you are big ofisaar, of course you know. Well, awar claab –“ He
indicated the rest of his companions with a sweep of his arm. “We are going to
haant down and keel all the jombies. For thees, you understand, we need saam chanda, donation. You know, for
transport, and food. So we need a leetle maany from you. Not too maach. Say,
fifty thousand.”
“Fifty
thou-“ Jogodish Babu’s voice cut off with a squeak, as though his wife was
back yanking at his collar. “I don’t have –“
“Look, Uncle,” the goon said impatiently,
“we habh no time. These jombies habh to be keeled. So eef you don’t pay, you
are being enemy of tha people because you are stopping aas from keeling them.”
“So we weel habh to take action against
you,” another young hoodlum said, rippling his biceps. “Eef fifty thousand ees
too maach, how about forty?”
“Or even thaarty,” the first criminal said.
“Baat thaarty, that ees the lowest we can go.”
“Get
lost,” Haru the Boor snapped, appearing at Jogodish Babu’s shoulder. He hefted
a crowbar at the end of one heavily muscled arm. “Or you’ll have trouble with
me, and you know who I am.”
The Trinobhoji Congress goons glared in
baffled fury. “We weel see you,” the leader said, pointing at Jogodish Babu. “Don’t
theenk we habh forgotten thees.”
“Don’t you have jombies to keel?” Haru the
Boor inquired. “Or shall I make you all jombies so you can keel yourselves?”
Muttering furiously, the goons stalked off.
Haru the Boor looked at them and at Jogodish Babu. He shrugged. “If they geev
you a haard time,” he said, “jaast call me. Are you all right?”
“I’m all right,” Jogodish Babu said. But he
wasn’t all right. He was terrified.
When those crooks came back –
“Well,” Haru the Boor said, cheerfully, “watch
out you don’t have a haart attack and die, or I weel habh to keel you aaftar
you become a jombee.”
Waving with his crowbar, he stalked off
down the lane.
**************************
By
evening, the zombie apocalypse had been almost completely licked.
It had never been any kind of threat to worry
about, of course. Cremated ashes didn’t come back to life, and cordons of
police around cemeteries effectively destroyed most of the few corpses intact
enough to dig their way out of graves without falling to pieces in the process.
One or two zombies did manage to walk on to the streets, but they were speedily
dispatched by trucks whose drivers enjoyed the opportunity to crush people
under their wheels without fear of the consequences.
The only ones not happy were some Muslim
and Christian organisations, who said that the rights of their dead were being
contravened. In one case, a terrorist cell decided to put the protest in more
concrete terms by constructing a bomb. It, however, went off prematurely,
blowing the cell members into pieces too small to be effective zombies, so that
was all right too. Otherwise, things went along swimmingly, and by nightfall
the threat was generally past.
There was one piece of political fallout.
The Trinobhoji Congress government in Bunglistan had refused to allow the
police to surround graveyards and eliminate zombies, on the grounds that people’s
religious rights were more important. The government in Delhi had taken a dim
view of the situation and sacked the Trinobhoji chief minister, imposing direct
rule on the state. The goons who had threatened Jogodish Babu in the morning
had suddenly lost their political protectors.
There would be, at least for now, no danger from them.
Jogodish Babu walked along the street from
the bus station, with no great desire to go home. The prospect of another
evening with his wife filled him with depression. He wished he could go to
Mitro Moshai’s, but he had no desire to risk another contact with a zombie in
the old man’s unlit lane. Besides, Mitro Moshai held no adda on Thursday, holding it to be unlucky.
Passing the market, he stopped at a fish
stall. By now, his wife would have finished the hilsa he’d bought yesterday.
If, he thought, he bought another hilsa as a peace offering, and stayed in all
evening, she might actually be happy for a change. Without wasting time on more
thought, he fished for his wallet, and bought a two-kilo fish. The cost was
exorbitant – the fish had been hunted to near-extinction in Bunglistan – but worth
it, if he could have some peace and quiet, not to speak of hilsa curry.
His wife was in a foul mood when he entered
the house. “I saw you talking to that boor, Haru,” she proclaimed. “I told you
many times not to associate weeth that chhotolok.
But weel you leesten?” She looked at the fish he was holding before him like a
shield. “Again you didn’t have it scaled
and cut up? What do you theenk I am, a feeshmonger woman?”
Jogodish Babu sighed. It seemed there was
nothing he could do that wasn’t the wrong thing. As his wife snatched the hilsa
from his hand and went into the kitchen, still yelling, he eased himself into
his chair and bent down to unlace his shoes.
The scream was so sudden and loud that he
banged his head on the table, straightening up. Through the open door of the
kitchen he could see his wife dancing around. The hilsa dangled from her hand,
its teeth buried in her fingers.
“What –“ Jogodish Babu said, blinking and
still rubbing his head. “What on earth –“
“Do saamtheeng,” his wife screamed. “Eet
eej biting me!”
“How can it bite you?” Jogodish Babu asked.
“It’s dead.”
“You useless fool,” his wife shouted. “You
can’t do anything at all.” Still dancing, she swung her arm. The hilsa lost its
grip and came flying through the air, plonking down on the table in front of
Jogodish Babu.
Jogodish Babu looked at the fish. The fish
looked at Jogodish Babu. “How does it feel like to be eaten?” it seemed to be
asking. Its dead mouth opened, displaying its little dead teeth. “Don’t you
wish you’d turned vegetarian when you could?”
And then, crawling on its fins, it lunged
across the table at him. There was some more screaming.
The Zombie Apocalypse was over. The Jombie
Apocalypse had only just begun.
And this time there was no way Bunglistan would win.
Copyright
B
Purkayastha 2013
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